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I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional antitrust norms analyze market power—as a stepping stone to anticompetitive effects and, hence, prohibited conduct—
from the perspective of product substitutability. Two goods or services
are said to compete with one another when they are reasonably interchangeable from the perspective of consumers, or to put it in more
formal economic terms, when there is cross-elasticity of demand between them. Conversely, when two goods or services are not reasonably interchangeable, they are not horizontally related and are said not
to compete with one another. Since a concern over horizontal agreements and horizontal effects dominate antitrust—courts even analyze
vertical agreement or merger cases in terms of their horizontal effects—proof of effects among substitutable goods or services is a crucial touchstone of antitrust analysis.
This “substitutability” approach to understanding competition and
market power fails to capture important economic phenomena when
applied to platform markets or other complex and technologically
evolving economic sectors featuring multiple potential value propositions for consumers. In such sectors, firms may compete aggressively
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a response to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Many thanks
to Lauren Libby for excellent research assistance.
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against each other without offering substitutable products or services
for sale. The rival firms may be “frenemies,” sharing simultaneously
co-dependent and complementary but rivalrous goals,1 but they are
not traditional competitors seeking to earn rents from the same
sectoral node. Tech and media giants compete to commoditize. Players
create products and services that commoditize the nodes of rivals. In
turn, these firms isolate their own value propositions by simply neutralizing the unique offerings of others.
Lest this jargon overly muddle the thesis, let me offer the short
version of three examples at the outset, one from the somewhat distant past, one from the fairly recent past, and one that is just beginning to emerge:
• In the late 1990s, Microsoft Corporation competed with Java
programmers and other technology companies over the future
of middleware and operating systems. Middleware and operating systems were not substitutable products—a consumer
would not choose to run a computer without an operating system and only use middleware—but middleware did threaten to
commoditize operating systems and shift most differentiated
value from operating systems to programs.
• In the early 2000s, Apple Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc. competed
aggressively in an ecosystem that included e-books, tablets, and
e-readers, and a host of related audio and visual products and
services. Apple and Amazon did have some substitutable offerings—for example, both sold devices for reading books—but
competition in substitutable products only begins to explain the
companies’ commercial antagonism. Amazon’s gambit was to
perpetuate its control over online retail; the Kindle was essentially a device to lock customers into Amazon’s retail world. Apple, by contrast, sought to commoditize the retail function and
created differentiated value in the physical device—the iPad.
• In the emerging ecosystem of connected and automated vehicles, there is intensive competition among a variety of different
players to establish or disestablish nodes as value propositions.
Traditional car companies wish to preserve the differentiated
automobile as a value proposition sought by consumers. Robotic
vehicle technology companies like Waymo LLC and some traditional OEMs like Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch) seek to commoditize the car itself and shift the value proposition to AV systems
that are vehicle-brand-agnostic. Fleet operators like Uber Technologies, Inc. and Lyft, Inc. would prefer to commoditize the vehicle entirely and establish transportation services through
1. See ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE
AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 147 (2016).
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robotaxi fleets as a value proposition. Finally, telecom or communications technology companies like Qualcomm Incorporated and Intel Corporation are pushing for the primary value
node to reside not in either vehicles nor ride sharing services,
but rather in the communications networks connecting vehicles
to other vehicles, roadside infrastructure, or “the cloud.”
While these examples differ in important regards, they demonstrate ways in which a sectoral ecosystem may exhibit intensive competition among firms that do not necessarily offer substitutable
products or services and hence fall outside of antitrust law’s preoccupation with horizontal competition. The question is whether antitrust
policy should adjust its ordinary analytical framework when assessing
competitive effects in such markets. In this Article, I will first flesh
out each of the three examples of ecosystem competition, then discuss
the effects of ecosystem competition on consumer welfare, and finally
turn to legal questions concerning the potential relevance of ecosystem competition to antitrust law.
II. THREE EXAMPLES OF ECOSYSTEM COMPETITION
A. Middleware and Operating Systems
My opening example concerns a puzzle at the center of United
States v. Microsoft Corp.: how Microsoft could have violated Section 2
of the Sherman Act by deceiving Java developers into creating Windows-dependent applications, when Java and other forms of “middleware”—such as Netscape Navigator—were held not to reside in the
relevant product market.2 Microsoft argued that its view that independent (i.e., platform-agnostic) middleware was a competitive threat
implied that middleware was in the same relevant market as the Windows operating system. Hence, Microsoft did not possess monopoly
power in the relevant market.3 The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, finding that, although Microsoft neutered middleware as a competitive threat to the Window’s monopoly, the relevant market should
exclude middleware because consumers could not substitute middleware for an operating system.4
The conventional reading of Microsoft is that the court excluded
middleware from the market because it was not yet substitutable for
an operating system from the perspective of customers even though
2. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam).
3. Id. at 53 (“Microsoft argues that, because middleware could usurp the operating
system’s platform function and might eventually take over other operating system functions (for instance, by controlling peripherals), the District Court erred
in excluding Navigator and Java from the relevant market.”).
4. Id. at 53–54.
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Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct allowed for this eventual possibility. But a somewhat different explanation is also possible: the development of independent middleware could eventually commoditize the
operating system by making software developers indifferent as to the
operating system on which their programs would run, since all operating systems would equally function to expose the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) chosen by the developers. In this story,
middleware did not evolve to take the place of operating systems, it
evolved toward commoditizing operating systems and transferring the
differentiated value in computer programs to the programs (and programmers) themselves. Microsoft directed its allegedly anticompetitive scheme toward stifling a competitive threat that was not—and
would not likely become—a substitute for what Microsoft produced,
but nonetheless threatened to eliminate Microsoft’s monopoly power
by shifting consumer value from operating systems to programs. The
relevant competition occurred among ecosystem rivals who were vying
for consumer dollars, but not necessarily vying to sell consumers the
same things.
B. E-Books and Tablets
Our second example of ecosystem competition concerns the rivalry
between Apple and Amazon that resulted in an unfavorable antitrust
judgment against Apple shortly after Apple CEO Steve Jobs’s untimely passing. Apple and Amazon co-existed for years with relatively
little commercial antagonism, but landed in a well-publicized skirmish over e-books in the second decade of the twenty-first century5—
the result of the two companies’ core business models coming into conflict over whether distribution or device would be commoditized in the
new digital world.
Although it has sprouted in many directions since its founding in
1994, Amazon’s core business has always been retail distribution.
When the company moved into the sale of hardware with the introduction of the Kindle e-reader in 2007, it did so not to diversify its business, but rather to stimulate demand for retail sales of e-books.
Amazon sold Kindles to entrench its core historic business—the online
bookstore. Amazon reportedly loses money on every unit of hardware
it sells.6 CEO Jeff Bezos admits: “We sell the hardware at our cost, so
5. The skirmish culminated in United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir.
2015).
6. See Kelly Clay, Amazon Confirms It Makes No Profit on Kindles, FORBES (Oct. 12,
2012, 01:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2012/10/12/amazon-con
firms-it-makes-no-profit-on-kindles/#289953996b43 [https://perma.unl.edu/YJ2
M-GN8W]; Jay Yarow, Chart of the Day: How Much Money Amazon is Making
from the Kindle, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2013, 4:20 PM), https://www.businessinsi
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it is break-even on the hardware.”7 The retail giant views the Kindle
as a commodity delivery device for high-margin online content such as
books and video content.
By contrast, since its founding in 1977, Apple has primarily been a
hardware company, and entered retail markets largely to strengthen
its position in personal device markets. When Apple launched the
iTunes store in 2003, its primary goal was to sell iPods, not songs.
Unlike Amazon’s entry into hardware, Apple’s entry into music retail
was somewhat profitable.8 Nevertheless, the venture’s most important business function was to entrench Apple’s position in the digital
player market even before the emergence of the smartphone and tablet. Similarly, when Apple launched the iBooks online bookstore in
2010 (subsequently renamed Apple Books), the company sought less
to compete with Amazon as a book retailer than to strengthen its position in the tablet market. Notably, Apple designed tablets to displace
the e-reader by offering a product that could perform many other functions in addition to displaying e-books. Apple does not disclose profitability by product line; however, book retailing is not likely a
significant profit center for the company, particularly given its shrinking e-book market share and the company’s decision to overhaul its
online bookstore in 2018.9
The clash that ultimately resulted in a finding of antitrust liability
against Apple showcases the intense competition to define value propositions in the e-books ecosystem. With the emergence of e-books in
2007, Amazon sought to keep customers locked into its platform. It
was willing to lose money on sales of e-books and Kindles to manage
the transition from physical books to e-books in a way that kept customers buying books from Amazon. To do that, Amazon had to maintain an overwhelming share of the e-books market—over ninety
percent—to keep customers accustomed to the Kindle system. Working from a wholesale distribution model, Amazon licensed e-book distribution rights from the seven largest publishing houses and then
sold them to customers often below its wholesale price—thus losing
der.com/chart-of-the-day-how-much-money-amazon-is-making-from-the-kindle2013-2 [https://perma.unl.edu/M2AB-2PXQ].
7. Clay, supra note 6.
8. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, How Much Revenue Did iTunes Generate for Apple Last
Quarter?, FORTUNE (July 21, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/07/21/how-much-reve
nue-did-itunes-generate-for-apple-last-quarter/ [https://perma.unl.edu/JTC5CKDT].
9. See Mark Gurman, Apple’s Getting Back into the E-books Fight Against Amazon,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-01-25/apple-is-said-to-ready-revamped-e-books-push-against-amazon
[https://perma.unl.edu/9ASP-FF4V] (reporting that Apple’s e-book market share
fell from 11% in October 2015 to 9% in February 2017).
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money on many transactions, but keeping customers loyal to the Kindle ecosystem.10
In launching the iPad in 2010, Apple sought to break Amazon’s
grip over the e-books ecosystem and to introduce a new technology—
the personal tablet—as its value proposition. Hardware was not essential to Amazon’s strategy—it never required customers to use a
Kindle. Amazon had shown a willingness to develop applications that
allowed customers to read books encoded in the proprietary Kindle
formats (.azw, .kf8, and .kfz) on other devices, such as PCs and Macs,
and eventually other tablets and smartphones. Amazon’s primary goal
was to ensure that customers transacted the retail function through
Amazon (i.e., bought from Amazon as a retailer in the Kindle format).
Apple, by contrast, intended to commoditize this same retail distribution function and accentuate the tablet. To do so, Apple had to create
competition in e-book distribution. So, it launched the Apple iBooks
store. In contrast to Amazon’s insistence on proprietary e-book formats, Apple made its books available in an open format.11 E-books
would be a commodity—the device on which customers read them
would matter far more.
In its attempt to unseat Amazon’s e-books dominance, Apple found
a willing alliance in book publishers that were concerned that Amazon
was permanently devaluing book content by selling e-books at belowcost prices. By leveraging the joint power of the book publishers, Steve
Jobs disposed of the wholesale model for e-book distribution and
flipped instead to an agency model in which the book publishers,
rather than Amazon, would set the retail price (and Amazon and Apple would collect a thirty percent distribution services fee). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately found this to be a
form of horizontal price-fixing over a strong dissent by Judge Jacobs,
who believed that Apple had acted pro-competitively by organizing the
book publishers to challenge Amazon’s retail hegemony over e-books.
Amazon and Apple, with the aid of their respective allies, locked in
an intense battle to define value propositions in the e-books ecosystem. The competitors were less interested in selling substitutable
products (which they did to some extent), and instead sought to define
the customer experience in how and what customers read. Amazon
and Apple battled over whether a customer’s critical purchasing decision was either where they bought an e-book or on what device they
chose to read. This was an intense, largely non-horizontal technological and commercial competition between ecosystem rivals with important implications for consumer welfare.
10. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 342 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
11. Chris Taylor, Hey Apple, Here’s How to Show the World You Love Books with iOS
12, MASHABLE (July 3, 2019), https://mashable.com/article/apple-books-previewios12/#L461HsOs8kqZ [https://perma.unl.edu/39JD-GJD5].
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C. Connected and Automated Vehicles
From the introduction of Ford’s Model T until recently, the automobile ecosystem functioned under a stable model: manufacturers
competed vigorously (at least since the emergence of European and
Japanese competition in the 1980s) to roll out new models of automobiles—highly differentiated products whose features were at least
tweaked in each model year and completely overhauled even within a
model line every three or four years, needed or not. Manufacturers
advertised intensely to consumers but distributed in most states only
through independent franchised dealers because of state dealer protection laws.12 Putting aside rental fleets—which are mostly used by
travelers on a short-term basis—cars are individually owned, maintained, and operated.
The automotive industry is leaving this model of individual ownership and operation of highly differentiated vehicles by the roadside
and ushering in the first true revolution since the advent of the internal combustion engine. Electric motors and automated driving are beginning to displace internal combustion and the human behind the
wheel. Connectivity among vehicles on the road (V2V), vehicles and
roadside infrastructure (V2I), and vehicles and “everything” (V2X)
through dedicated short range communications (DSRC) in the 5.9 GHz
frequency or 5G telecommunications will make driving an activity
centrally coordinated in real time, eliminating the individualistic
model of driver-dominated decision-making. Companies expect customers to abandon individual vehicle ownership in favor of automated
ridesharing.
In anticipation of these coming revolutionary trends, traditional
car companies are attempting to shift their business models away
from the traditional manufacturing and sales model and into a “transportation-as-a-service” model. Ford Motor Company, Daimler AG, and
General Motors Company have all announced plans to launch ridesharing services in competition not only with Uber and Lyft, but also
with technology companies like Alphabet Inc.’s (Google’s) Waymo unit.
The entire competitive ecosystem is rapidly shifting:
[C]ompeting in the on-demand mobility market will pit legacy automakers
against ride-hailing services from startups and tech giants that have far
greater experience in acquiring and engaging consumers through digital channels. To succeed in what will likely be a hyper-competitive market for urban
ride-hailing, automakers will have to foster new skill sets in their organizations, and transform from companies that primarily produce vehicles to ones
that also manage vehicle fleets and customer relationships. That will entail
competing with startups and tech giants for software development and data
science talent, as well as reforming innovation processes to keep pace with
12. See Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Capitalism, 101 IOWA L. REV. 573 (2016).
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digital trendsetters. Automakers will also need to create unique mobile app
and in-car experiences to lure customers.13

Who are the competitors in this evolving ecosystem? Conventional
models of substitutability do not begin to describe the competitive relationships that characterize this ecosystem. It is not just that car
companies are being forced to become ride-sharing service providers
and mobile app purveyors. Nor is it just that ride-sharing companies
are heavily investing in automated technologies and product development and hence becoming more like car companies; that software
firms like Google and Apple are making technological moves that
make them increasingly look like Tier 1 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs); and that telecommunications companies are thinking
about becoming transportation service providers. That perspective
still imagines that competition occurs only when previously non-competitive companies transition into each other’s spaces to vie for customers’ attention. Many of the most significant competitive dynamics
in the connected and automated vehicle ecosystem occur among firms
that are unlikely to sell substitutes or unlikely to define themselves in
the same relevant market through evidence of demand cross-elasticity. Uber and Lyft will unlikely become automobile manufacturers.
Qualcomm may never administer a ride-sharing service. General Motors may never become a major app developer. And yet, all of these
companies, and many others, are competing hard to define the value
propositions in the connected and automated vehicle ecosystem.
There are many vectors of competition over which industry participants are vying. Will the automobile become a commodity—a fungible
transportation pod whose brand the average consumer notices no
more than the brand of the city bus or subway car—or will even the
shared automated vehicle remain a differentiated status symbol and
marker of personal identity? Will automated vehicle features and protocols become standardized through regulation or industry standardsetting, or will AV technology suppliers continue to compete to offer
differentiated products? Will communication among vehicles and
roadside infrastructure become centrally defined and managed, with
telecommunications services largely commoditized, or will competition
among distinctive telecommunications networks play an important
role in shaping the connected vehicle ecosystem?
It is too early to tell how these, and many related questions, will be
answered, and not clear which firms have the interests to push for
commoditization or differentiation of the ecosystem’s nodes. What is
certain, however, is that, as the ecosystem develops, there will be an
13. By the End of 2019, Waymo, Uber, and GM All Plan to Have Fleets of Autonomous
Cars Providing On-Demand Rides—Here’s How Automakers Can Compete, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-autono
mous-mobility-ecosystem-report-2018-3 [https://perma.unl.edu/UY9L-LW3C].
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intense rivalry to shape the ecosystem to their own commercial advantage, including among firms that are not conventional horizontal
competitors.
III. HOW ECOSYSTEM COMPETITION ENHANCES
CONSUMER WELFARE
It is easy to observe that firms that are not horizontally related
sometimes compete against each other, although this statement requires some qualifications. Two firms selling completely different
products in completely different markets might compete over buyers
of inputs (for example, to lease the same office building) and still be
horizontal buyers (rather than sellers) under antitrust laws.14 But rivalries exist among firms that are related neither as buyers, nor as
sellers. For example, unrelated businesses might compete aggressively to shape public infrastructure development to benefit their particular line of business or vie to influence political processes in
directions favorable to their own commercial interests.
I raise these examples to make the point that just because two or
more firms are “competing” over something does not necessarily make
their competition relevant to the set of issues of concern to antitrust
lawyers and economists—i.e., rivalrous market behavior affecting the
welfare of consumers (broadly conceived). So arises the question of
whether the ecosystem competition described in this Article is the sort
of competition that shapes the efficiency of markets (producing lower
prices, enhanced output, higher quality, and innovation) and hence
enhances consumer welfare. Should antitrust law be interested in the
subversion of ecosystem competition, on the view that such subversion
harms consumer welfare by suppressing a relevant dimension of
competition?
Ecosystem competition among firms that are not horizontally related (or are related horizontally only minimally) do have important
consequences for consumer welfare, and hence should be a proper subject of antitrust scrutiny (more on this in the final section). These consequences—again, defined as competition to commoditize or
differentiate nodes in an ecosystem of complementary products and
services—can be seen as to both static and dynamic efficiency.
On the static or price effects side, ecosystem competition occurs as
sellers of complementary products or services seek to simultaneously
commoditize the nodes controlled by other firms while trying to preserve differentiation in the nodes they dominate. Apple sought to commoditize the retail distribution function for e-books, making
customers indifferent about the platform from which they purchased a
14. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948);
Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).
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book, while shifting the value proposition into the e-reading device
(i.e., the tablet). Amazon tried to accomplish the reverse. The motives
behind this reciprocal commoditization strategy are clear from the economics of complementary products. The sales and profitability of
each product depends on the price of complementary products—
roughly speaking, Apple loses sales of iPads (or must reduce their
price) if Amazon charges a high retail price for content, while Amazon
loses sales of content (or must reduce their price) if Apple controls the
tablet market and charges a high price. Each firm makes more money
if the node controlled by the other firm is commoditized, in the sense
that customers become indifferent on the seller from which they procure the relevant product or service, and hence pay a lower price than
they would in a more differentiated or heterogeneous market.
Alternatively, imagine that Apple and Amazon enter into a nonaggression pact, in which Apple agrees to take no action that reduces
Amazon’s dominance in online retailing and Amazon will do nothing
to diminish Apple’s brand power in iPads. Further, assume that Apple
never intended seriously to invest in an e-bookstore to put competitive
pressure on Amazon (not entirely counterfactual, at least until recently) and that Amazon never meant to seriously compete with Apple
in the wider tablets market (the Kindle being essentially limited to an
e-reader). Instead, suppose each firm had the ability through its strategic alliances and actions to affect the differentiation or commoditization of the other’s primary node. The non-aggression agreement would
essentially function as a market-division agreement among firms that
are not, and did not intend to be, horizontal competitors, with the effect of higher prices and reduced output in both nodes. The effect
might mimic the disintegration of a previously vertically integrated
firm, where post-disintegration prices increased and output decreased
due to double marginalization.
Ecosystem competition can also have important effects on dynamic
efficiency. On the one hand, not all ecosystem competition directly entails product innovation. Firms sometimes compete to shape sectoral
nodes into differentiated or commoditized markets through marketing
or commercial strategies that do not involve new product development. For example, a development effort to replicate an existing online bookstore without introducing new features or functions, or a
marketing campaign designed to educate customers about their ability freely to port their content between different platforms—thus commoditizing the platforms—serves to commoditize a rival node without
directly changing the products or services offered to consumers. On
the other hand, ecosystem competition does have significant dynamic
efficiency effects. Returning to the Apple and Amazon example, Apple’s effort to commoditize the e-book retailing market by launching
an e-bookstore was part of its broader strategy to create a new product
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market—the personal tablet—that could move far past Amazon’s ereader in uses and functionality. Apple saw the commoditization of
retail distribution of tablet-accessible content as critical to the success
of its new hardware product line.
As with antitrust analysis generally, one should not overclaim by
assuming that all ecosystem competition is important to either static
or dynamic efficiency. The Supreme Court has been quite right in recent decades to note that sometimes intense horizontal rivalry has no
general effects on market competitiveness or consumer welfare15 The
point is not that ecosystem competition invariably affects consumer
welfare or should always be of interest to antitrust law, but rather
that it can sometimes have important efficiency effects of the kinds
that concern antitrust analysis.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY
The concept of non-horizontal competition is not new to antitrust
law—antitrust agencies sometimes analyze mergers through a “perceived potential competition” or “actual potential competition” lens
that assumes that a firm may act as a competitive constraint without
yet acting as a horizontal competitor.16 Such cases, however, still consider the relevant competition to involve a horizontal relationship—
albeit one that does not yet exist or one that businesses perceive as a
threat that constrains business behavior. The ecosystem competition
described in this Article may occur among complimentary firms that
do not perceive one another as ever likely to offer substitutable products or services. Similarly, there has been some discussion in antitrust
scholarship about “vertical competition” among vertically related
firms in the production-to-distribution chain.17 Vertical competition—
and efforts to commoditize nodes upstream or downstream in a traditional vertical chain—may describe some of the relationship characteristic of ecosystem competition. However, the phenomenon with
which this Article is concerned is broader, since firms whose products
are complementary, rather than vertically related, also compete for
primacy in broad ecosystems that do not resemble the conventional
vertical model.
Although, as noted at the outset, current legal conventions for defining relevant markets and market power rely heavily on the as15. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)) (“Even an act of pure
malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state
a claim under the federal antitrust laws.”).
16. See, e.g., Darren S. Tucker, Potential Competition Analysis Under the 2010
Merger Guidelines, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 273 (2011).
17. See Robert L. Steiner, A Dual-Stage View of the Consumer Goods Economy, 35 J.
ECON. ISSUES 27, 27 (2001).
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sumption that competition means horizontal rivalry over substitutes,
nothing in the statutory structure of antitrust law precludes conceiving of competition to include ecosystem competition. As Justice
Holmes famously protested, the Sherman Act “says nothing about
competition.”18 The casting of Section 1 and Section 2 analyses in
terms of horizontal competition is a product of malleable common law
development. We still have a law of vertical restraints and vertical
mergers. The Clayton Act does reference “competition,” but the 1950
Celler-Kefauver amendments eliminated language that could be interpreted to limit the statute’s reach to horizontal competition.
The important question is not whether the existing antitrust statutes could be made applicable to ecosystem competition (they could),
but whether it would be advisable to do so, and if so, what kind of
cases might be brought under an ecosystem competition theory. On
this question, an important framing observation: the burden of this
Article is to broaden the understanding of what constitutes competition relevant to the antitrust laws. One might assume that this would
lead to broadening the domain of antitrust liability to comprehend and
condemn conduct otherwise falling outside the scope of the antitrust
laws. That result might well occur, and I shall offer an example momentarily. But in antirust analysis, broadening lenses does not invariably result in more liability. Sometimes, broadening lenses decreases
concerns that conduct in question is harmful. For example, in a
merger case, behind the veil of ignorance one cannot know whether
the merging parties would prefer a broader or narrower relevant geographic market. Broadening a market could dilute the parties’ respective shares in the market and its concentration, to their advantage in
antitrust proceedings. However, two parties arguing that their merger
is not horizontal because they are not competitors in the same relevant market would want to draw narrow rather than broad markets,
since broadening the relevant market definition could make them
competitors for purposes of the relevant antitrust analysis. In the
same way, recognizing ecosystem competition as a species relevant to
antitrust law would not necessarily result in expanded antitrust liability—whether it would expand or contract liability would depend on
the facts of each case.
As an example of how recognizing ecosystem competition might expand antitrust liability, consider the potential acquisition by an ecommerce platform of a software input supplier. At present, such an
acquisition would be analyzed under a relatively permissive vertical
merger standard that asks whether the vertical integration would
foreclose opportunities to competitors in either relevant sector—e-

18. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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commerce or software design.19 In other words, the vertical merger
analysis asks how the merger would affect competition between each
of the merging parties and their horizontal competitors. It does not
inquire as to how the cessation of competition between the merging
firms might affect the competitive ecosystem in which they both participate. If there is evidence that the merging firms previously were
involved in an intensive rivalry directed against each other to shape
their respective nodes as commodities or sites of differentiated value,
then the merger might reduce consumer welfare, even if it had no foreclosure effect on either firm’s horizontal rivalry.
Conversely, recognizing ecosystem competition as a genuine competitive phenomenon could be advantageous to firms resisting antitrust liability. Consider a horizontal merger between two firms in a
somewhat concentrated market that raises unilateral effects concerns
under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines—i.e., concerns that the firms
are sufficiently close substitutes in a differentiated market that, postmerger, they might become so profitable as to be able to raise price,
reduce output, or limit innovation even without coordinating with
other firms in the market. Evidence that the merging firms are competing aggressively over differentiation and commoditization against
non-horizontally related firms in the same ecosystem could reduce the
antitrust agencies’ concerns over the unilateral exercise of monopoly
power post-merger.
Ecosystem competition is undoubtedly a genuine phenomenon, and
nothing in the structure of the antitrust statutes prevents its inclusion in antitrust analysis. However, that does not necessarily mean
that it would be desirable to expand the notion of “competition” within
the antitrust laws to include ecosystem competition. Identifying the
incidence, mechanisms, and effects of ecosystem would be complex,
and adding complexity in pursuit of precision does not invariably improve outcomes.20 This Article has sought to identify and name a competitive phenomenon (largely) excluded from antitrust analysis in the
hopes of spurring a conversation about whether formal antitrust analysis warrants its explicit inclusion.

19. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 18-5214, slip op. at 18–34 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26,
2019).
20. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).

